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1. SUMMARY: Petrs Black, et al., contend that CAB im-
properly ruled that the judge at resp's probation revocation 
hearing was required to consider other alternatives to imprison-
/ 
ment, under Gagnon v. Scar12elli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973), ana 
Morrissey Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). In his 
t/ 
for v. cross-petn 
cert, · resp contends that the judge at his probation revocation 
hearing erroneously admitted a witness's testimony in violation 
of that witness's Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination. 
2. FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: In 1976, resp plea guilty 
to two counts of transferring ana selling a large quantity of 
marijuana. He was given a suspenaea sentence of two concurrent 
20-year prison terms ana placed on probation for 5 years. In 
1977, while on probation, resp was arrested ana charged with 
leaving the scene of an automobile accident--a felony in Missou-
ri. At a probation revocation hearing, resp's probation was re-
voked ana the concurrent 20-year terms imposed. Resp began serv-
ing the sentence immediately. The felony charge was later re-
ducea to careless ana reckless driving, a misdemeanor, for which 
resp was fined $100 ana costs. 
Resp then filed various state ana federal motions for 
post-conviction relief, which were fruitless until his 1982 fil-
ing in DC of a petn for habeas corpus challenging the constitu-
tionality of his probation revocation proceeding. While the petn 
was• pending, resp was released on parole. The DC granted the 
writ on the ground that resp was denied due process by the 
judge's failure, during the revocation proceeding, to consider 
f 
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alternatives to the imposition of the prison terms to which resp 
had previously been sentenced. CA8 affirmed, declining to rule 
on resp's cross-appeal on the witness's self-incrimination claim. 
3. CONTENTIONS: -- Petrs: Petrs contend that CA8's 
ruling that the judge was required to consider alternatives to 
imprisonment before reimposing the 20-year imprisonment is not 
required by either Morrissey or Gagnon, and is in conflict with 
this Court's decision in Bearden v. Georgia, 103 s.ct. 2064 
(1983), in which JUSTICE WHITE's concurrence stated that there 
was no support in the Court's case law for the majority's conclu-
sion that a sentencing court is required to consider alternative 
means of punishment other than imprisonment when probation must 
be revoked because a probationer cannot pay his fine. Id., at 
2074. 
Petrs also contend that CA8 was required under 28 u.s.c. 
§2254 (d) to presume that the sentencing judge considered other 
sentencing alternatives and found them lacking. They argue that 
CA8's second-guessing of the state sentencing judge here is con-
trary to its treatment of a federal sentencing judge in United 
States v. Burkhalter, 588 F.2d 604, 607 (CA8 1978), in which the 
court presumed that the DC had considered everything it should 
have. To hold state courts to a higher standard is unfair. 
Finally, petrs argue that even · if the rulings below were 
correct, resp should not have been unconditionally released. In-
stead, a hearing should have been ordered at which the judge 
would be directed to consider alternatives to imprisonment. 
Gagnon holds that prisoner should not be released outright until 
i 
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the state has had a chance to correct any due process deficiency 
in the revocation proceeding. 
Resp: In response to petr s' contentions, resp argues 
that Gagnon and Morrissey require a court to consider alterna-
tives to imprisonment, that other federal and state courts agree, 
and that CAB' s decision does not conflict with Bearden because 
that case is limited on its facts to probationers who cannot pay 
their court-imposed fines. Resp also contends that no hearing 
should be held to permit the sentencing judge to consider alter-
natives to imprisonment because a trial judge may not supplement 
a record to cure errors after he has relinquished jurisdiction. 
In addition, resp contends that the §2254(d) presumption does not 
apply because the judge made no factual findings to which any 
higher court can defer, and oecause the question is a mixed one 
of law and fact. 
Resp also argues that CAB correctly ordered his uncondi-
tional release because the revocation hearing was unconstitution-
al, a nullity, and therefore, the courts no longer had jurisdic-
tion over him. Moreover, Mo. statute requires that a probationer 
be released once he has completed his probation term, and he suc-
cessfully completed his in jail. It would be unfair to hold an-
other revocation hearing over 7 years after his probation was 
first revoked. Finally, CA8's decision is limited to its facts 
and of no precedential value; hence review by this Court is un-
wartanted. 
In his cross-petn, resp argues that in revoking his pro-
bation, the judge erroneously relied on testimony by a witness to 
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the automobile accident, who had claimed her Fifth Amendment 
right against self-incrimination. Resp had claimed that he was 
not driving the car at the time of the accident. The witness in 
question admitted, in response to a question by the prosecution, 
that she had told police at the scene that she was a passenger in 
the car resp was driving at the time of the accident. The judge 
then requested the court reporter to read back the question and 
the witness's answer. The prosecutor also restated the question 
to see if the witness had understood it, at which point the wit-
ness took the fifth in response. She stated that she had not 
understood the question the first time, but the judge ruled that 
she had waived the privilege as to that question. Resp contends 
that this testimony was erroneous because the waiver was not 
knowing, and that his due process rights were violated by the 
wrongful admission of this prejudicial testimony. 
Petrs have waived response to the cross-petn. 
4. ilrscussroN: Neither Morrissey nor Gagnon holds, as J 
CA8 said they did, that a sentencing judge must consider alterna- T rJ/l.,A.A. 
tives to imprisonment in a probation revocation proceeding. 
Morrissey did hold that a judge is required to give written find-
ings of his reasons for revoking parole, and both cases noted 
that part of the reason for requiring revocation hearings is to 
help ensure that the judge weighs the individual's situation and 
decides whether revocation is appropriate or whether rehabilita-
tioR can continue outside of prison. Nonetheless, the cases fall 
short of requiring the judge to [explici ~ con~ lternatives 
' . ,. 
No. 84-5557-cfh page 6. 
to imprisonment, and JUSTICE WHITE noted this in his concurrence 
in Bearden. 
On the other hand, the sentencing judge here apparently 
made very sparse findings of fact. Petrs rely on the judge's 
statement during the original sentencing that if at any time resp 
violated the conditions of probation, the judge would send him to 
jail for 20 years to argue that it was clear the judge thought 
imprisonment would be the only proper al terna ti ve should resp 
violate his probation. CA8 ruled that this was just the usual 
threat to probationers to make them toe the line. 
Although I find the case to be close, given the lack of 
direct support in Morrissey and Gagnon for CA8's decision, I am 
inclined to recommend a denial. Petrs have cited no lower court 
cases in conflict, while resp has cited several state and federal 
cases supporting CA8's view. Although CAB erred in reading 
Morrissey and Gagnon as direct support, CAB's decision can be 
seen as a logical extension of the thrust of those cases to en-
sure a thorough investigation of a probationer's case before pro-
bation is revoked. Moreover, although CA8 was not limited to its 
facts, as resp contends, I am sure that that court was reacting 
in part to the facts that resp had received the maximum sentence 
for the marijuana charges--the first brush he had ever had with 
the law--and that he was sent to serve that sentence because of a 
felony charge, later reduced to a misdemeanor, that was not re-
motely related to the marijuana misdeeds. 
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presumption applies, petrs argue only that the record did not 
show that the judge's decision was clearly erroneous, and they 
admit that it is unclear whether the judge considered any sen-
tencing alternatives. 
As to whether the court er red in granting an uncondi-
tional release, petrs err in arguing that Gagnon requires that a 
hearing be held. There, the parolee had been released from jail 
to parole before his case was decided; because parole involved 
restraints on liberty, the Court held that a hearing must be held 
to determine whether the previous probation revocation had been 
proper. Although I do not see much merit in resp's argument that 
the court has relinquished jurisdiction over him, nonetheless, he 
has completely served in jail the time that he would have been on 
probation. This Court has ruled in a different context that an 
individual may serve his probation time in jail. Burns v. United 
States, 287 U.S. 216, 233 (1932). 
If the petn is denied, there is no need to consider 
resp's cross-petn. This claim is not cert-worthy, in any event, 
because the judge's ruling that the witness had waived her Fifth 
Amendment right essentially depends on a factual finding that she 
had understood the question when posed to her the first time. 
This finding was reasonable under the circumstances, and I see no 
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